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This issue is dedicated to the brave officers and agents whose obituaries begin on page 49.

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East Asians in Soviet Intelligence and the Continuities between Soviet and Russian Intelligence Practices

by Jon K. Chang PhD

ABSTRACT: This is the third study by this author on East Asians in Soviet intelligence (abbreviated as EASI). It introduces the fact that some six-hundred plus East Asian OGPU and NKVD agents performed the punitive "special tasks" of the foreign division (INO) of the OGPU/NKVD from 1920 to 1945 on foreign soil. From 2000 to 2014, the Russian Federation produced documentary films, newspaper articles, and at least two monographs on Operation Maki-Mirage (the operation which involved the East Asians). Yet, there was no mention of any of the contributions of the Soviet East Asians. The Soviet minority agents (Soviet Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Turks, Koreans, Chinese, and others) possessed linguistic and cultural knowledge that others did not. Others could be taught these abilities, but couldn't be taught to act as naturally as the diaspora peoples in playing their roles as titular nationals (that is, a Finn from Finland or a Korean from Korea). Therefore, my research was conducted with the intent to correct this erasure and to add more depth and understanding to the history of Soviet intelligence, the USSR, and Northeast Asia. Finally, this article demonstrates four main points or "understandings." First, there are strong "continuities" between the intelligence practices of the USSR and the Russian Federation. Second, Maki-Mirage is an example of a large-scale operation which was not as simple as those such as Trust and Syndicate. The operations that are depicted in this study contain ample amounts of deception, distraction (upon entering foreign soil) and cover. Third, the strength of Soviet intelligence was its ethnic diversity. Last, if one seeks unparalleled depth in historical research, consider utilizing long-term oral history (and the collection of photos) *in situ*.

Special Tasks [INO, NKVD] became the principal unit responsible for intelligence operations against Germany and its satellites....We had under our command a force of twenty thousand men and women, including two thousand foreigners, among them Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, and Romanians.... The Fourth Directorate [INO, NKVD] comprised sixteen sections, two of them monitoring developments in the Far East and China, the rest concerned with Germany, Scandinavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and the Middle East.[1]

–Pavel Sudoplatov, former deputy chief of Foreign Intelligence, NKVD (INO, NKVD)

In the above epigraph, Sudoplatov spoke of the USSR (in 1941-42) possessing some twenty thousand agents many of whom were the Soviet diaspora peoples, national minorities and émigré communists to be sent abroad to perform espionage and other "special tasks." This pronouncement was read by thousands of Soviet historians and intelligence experts without any further research to confirm or deny it *until now*. This study will also demonstrate strong historical "continuities" between Soviet intelligence and that of the Russian Federation in regards to theory, practice(s), and ethos.

In order to do so, I present a little known case of how the Soviet Union sent some six hundred East Asian NKVD and GRU agents into Manchuria (after 1931 Manchukuo), China proper and Korea from 1920 to 1945.[2] This case of East Asians in Soviet intelligence (abbreviated as EASI) partially confirms the words of Sudoplatov. It remains one of the larger intelligence discoveries with an unprecedented level of depth and discovery (through videotaped interviews and contemporary photos from the 1930s to the present) since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Methodologies and Their Selection (The Why?)

One of my primary goals in conducting this research and writing is to capture the sense of agency, initiative, pain and frustration of being a national (that is, ethnic) minority in a putative liberal, progressive socialist state (or any other type of state).[3] My belief is that the "winners write history" and in most nation-states/polities this means that the state and its dominant majority (some polities employ the one majority-one minority rule to simulate equality) will receive a preponderance of attention and recognition. These groups will occupy the dominant role(s) in the historical narrative of the state archives. The diaspora nationalities of the USSR under Stalin played the peculiar role of "last among socialist equals" and

1. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—a Soviet Spymaster*, trans. Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1994), 126-127.

2. Jon K. Chang, "East Asians in Soviet Intelligence and the Chinese-Lenin School of the Russian Far East," *Eurasia Border Review 9*, no. 1 (2018): 62 and Dmitrii Ancha and Nelli Miz, *Kitaiskaia diaspora vo Vladivostoke: stranitsy istorii, 2-e izdanie* [*Chinese Diaspora in Vladivostok: The Pages of History*, Second ed.] (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 2015), 285. Four hundred Koreans and Chinese were recruited at the Chinese-Lenin School. Another 200 plus were recruited for Soviet intelligence service from the Red Army, due to their work as Soviet cadres and from civilian life. The latter group of 200 plus men and women were almost all Soviet citizens.

3. The Soviets claimed they were the only state in the world to offer "legal and actual equality" in 1923. See Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 16.

were typically portrayed as being actual or potential fifth columnists from the 1920s until Stalin's death in 1953.[4]

In 2006 and 2007, I lived and worked in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan full-time. Afterwards, I spent from typically four to seven months a year conducting fieldwork from 2008 to 2010 and 2014 to 2018 in Central Asia. The goal was to capture my own sense of life in the former USSR and post-Soviet countries and to be able to tell when someone (an interviewee) was bending the truth or outright telling me a tall-tale in Russian. This required time *in situ* collecting interviews and especially the personal photos (or any available photos) to corroborate the said account/history. Also the backstory (the secondary details or the inter-relationships between the "EASI" and his/her family) was often very interesting, quirky, and contained many indiscreet remarks and details. Take for example the comments of respondent seven (the seventh relative of an East Asian Soviet intelligence officer) who wished to remain anonymous. I said to this person, "This is incredible, you know so many more details than the others. It seems like you were collecting all of his information in order to someday give a full account of his life and exploits, correct?" Respondent seven's answer was the following:

> No, not at all. Grandfather did not like to help my mother or grandmother in the kitchen. Either he would cook all of the meal or he would do nothing at all. He did not like to do very much handiwork around the house either. He had *us* do the handiwork. So I was a kid, when I was watching television, he would lie on the couch and repeat his stories. He spent much of his life just lying on the couch expecting *us* to wait on him hand and foot [look of consternation]. After awhile, you would know his stories backwards and forwards and all variations in between. There is *nothing special about how I got this information* [italics by author].

Oral history *in situ* along with the collection of personal photos, fieldwork (around Soviet cities, collective farms, to see the personal, economic, and structural relations) and archival work were my basis for creating and writing the closest recreation of the past possible for the Soviet Koreans and Chinese. This is what I have called 3-D history consisting of fieldwork *in situ*, photos, and archives. If at all possible, my suggestion is that one avoid interviews with political émigrés. The interview with a political émigré is the one which is sometimes too "picture perfect" in its narrative and contains less predictive power. Political émigrés are human beings; they want to survive and to be of service. Therefore, the interviews are not "optimal" oral history.

Figure 1: Illarion Em (far right) intensely listening to Gleb Li (2nd from left with his hands out), June 4, 2009 in a meeting with elderly Korean deportees in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Photo by author.

In the Field: Meeting Gleb Li

In 2008, I returned to Uzbekistan and the environs outside of Tashkent which were full of over 35 former Soviet Korean collective farms. In Tashkent, I met Illarion Em who helped me set up a dinner and full day of interviewing eight or nine elderly Koreans about life in the Russian Far East during the 1920s and 1930s (prior to the Korean deportation of 1937). It was on this day that I met Gleb Li who was the first person to tell me about Soviet Koreans and Chinese serving in Soviet intelligence and to provide a picture and short biography of the former.



Figure 2: Gleb Semyonovich Li in his apartment in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; June 8, 2009. Photo by author.

During the middle of an interview on June 4, 2009, Mr. Gleb Li approached me rather impatiently and said, "Jon, may I talk with you for a moment. My story is rare and it's one that I don't think the others have. My grandfather Shen Li was a famous Chekist (GPU/OGPU). He was sent to Korea on an espionage mission, captured by the Japanese around 1928 and

4. The Soviet Chinese and Koreans were seen as "vectors" of Japanese influence and empire despite the USSR's Japanese-Soviet Convention of 1925. This treaty welcomed Japan back to the RFE (to signify "Russian Far East" throughout this article) as a most-favored nation. See Jon K. Chang, *Burnt by the Sun: The Koreans of the Russian Far East* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016), 66, 83, 86-88, 157.

tortured. He survived 1928 and somehow made it back to the RFE where he was congratulated for his work and celebrated for surviving Japanese torture." I was in the middle of an interview with someone else. Thus, we agreed to meet later at his home and conduct an interview.

As luck would have it, four days later, I met Gleb but he was now hesitant to give a full interview. He did not know any particular details about his grandfather's service in the OGPU/NKVD nor about the details of the mission in 1928.[5] Gleb knew that his grandfather, Shen Li, spoke only Korean and Russian and that the mission most probably involved his crossing into Manchuria or Korea (but not Japan). Fortunately, he allowed me to scan the photo of his grandfather which appears below as Figure 3.

Figure 3: The three Li brothers, 1920 in the Russian Far East. Shen Li (center), was a Chekist at the time of this photo in 1920 and served until his death in 1937-38. Photo courtesy of Gleb Li, grandson of Shen Li.

There is a case of a Korean Cheka agent in the Soviet archives which was eerily similar. This agent, Mr. Lee (Li), was sent on a mission to the Japanese empire to blow up bridges and perform other "special tasks." This occurred in 1932. On July 7, 1932 the Japanese embassy (in Moscow) informed the Soviets that Japan had captured four Korean OGPU officers. The Japanese interrogated a Soviet Korean, Mr. Lee (Li) who admitted that the four Koreans had been recruited by the GPU in Vladivostok.[6] They had been sent to Korea to blow up a number of bridges, but were caught, arrested and interrogated. [The footnote states "GPU," the GPU was the name of the OGPU/NKVD from 1922-1923].[7] Stalin's response was chronicled in a letter to his deputy, Lazar Kaganovich which states:

> The arrest of some Korean subversives and the involvement of our agencies in this affair creates (or could create) a new risk of provoking a conflict with Japan. Who needs this, other than the enemies of Soviet rule? Be sure to send an inquiry to the Far Eastern leaders, find out what is going on and punish the violators of the USSR's interests as an example.... Have a chat with [Viacheslav] Molotov and take Draconian measures against the criminals at the OGPU and the Intelligence Bureau...[8]

Thus, both my fieldwork and the archival work of other scholars note that Koreans had been sent abroad in the OPGU/NKVD to the Japanese empire to perform various subversive acts of espionage and terrorism. The story above (four Korean OGPU officers) also shares many similarities to the photo of three Korean OGPU officers in Figure 4 (dated March 15, 1932).

Figure 4: Three Korean OGPU officers. Underneath the photo, in Russian, the Khan family wrote, "Khan Chan Ger (to the right) 1932 yr., March 15th, city of Blagoveshchensk [Russia]." The three Koreans were being sent to Manchuria at or around this date. Photo courtesy of Revmir I. Khan. The "hands on the belt clasp" was an NKVD sign meaning "ready to protect and serve [the USSR]."

East Asians in Soviet Intelligence

According to Soviet literature(s), Operation Maki-Mirage by the OGPU/NKVD ran from 1924 to 1937. During that operation, the NKVD placed several moles inside the Japanese anti-Soviet intelligence operations run by Miiazaki and Kumazava in Sakhalien, China (next to Blagoveshchensk, Russia; currently called Heihe, China).[9] They fed the Japanese

5. Gleb Li was not one-hundred percent sure of the year in which his grandfather was captured. He said that the year 1928 was what was told to him, but not from his grandfather.

6. Lee is the American transliteration of the Korean last name Li/Lee. Li is the Russian transliteration.

7. R.W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk and E.A. Rees, eds., *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 156fn13. Note that this monograph is an archival document collection.

8. Ibid., 151.

9. Drs. Kuromiya and Peplonski also believe that Maki-Mirage was a deception operation, see Hiroaki Kuromiya and Andrzej Peplonski, "The Great Terror. Polish-Japanese Connections," *Cahiers du monde russe* 50: 4 (2009): 661. Also of note is Nair's account of his work training Koreans (from

disinformation while gathering information on the alleged two hundred plus Japanese intelligence agents and informants throughout Manchuria, the Russian Far East, and the Transbaikal area.[10] It is possible that Operation Maki-Mirage was simply a front for the penetration and operations of Soviet intelligence in Manchuria, Korea, and China proper.[11]

Figure 5: (Left) photo- Chinese laborers in Vladivostok between 1919-1920. (Right) photo- Korean residents of Vladivostok, 1919-1920. Note the younger Korean men to the left of the older Korean in the center. The younger men wore hybrid clothing. Western jacket, scarf, hat and shoes with traditional Korean pipes, pants and shirt-blouses. By the 1930s, most of the East Asians working or living in the USSR wore the "hybrid" look or dressed completely "Western." Photos courtesy of Dmitrii A. Ancha.

Returning to the East Asian agents, the more they dressed down (to look like common laborers, see Figure 5), the easier they found it to cross the border into Manchuria and conduct their missions unnoticed. This was part of their natural "deception and cover" and why they were recruited and chosen. Their targets in Manchuria were typically the same as those of any other espionage and counter-espionage operations. Typically, the East Asian Soviet agents were sent to: carry out assassinations of leaders of anti-Soviet groups such as the Russian Fascists, White Guardists, and various Monarchist (restoration of the Tsar) groups, obtain guarded information, steal cipher machines, and blow up railway lines, bridges, and official transport vehicles carrying military leaders and politicians.[12] The Asian agents were sent in groups of eight to twelve along with the "Russians"[13] or they were sent in groups of three to four by themselves.[14] If sent in a group of twelve, the group would split up upon entering Manchuria. The "Russian" agents typically were part of the distraction in what the Soviets typically called a deception maneuver (*otvlekaiushchii manyovr*). All eyes were on the Russians while the East Asians would enter unnoticed as coolies and perform the main "special tasks."[15]

Some of the so-called "Russian" agents were originally from Manchuria but went to the USSR in their late teens to mid-twenties (after Red Army service) and began their higher education in the USSR where they were recruited by the Soviet OGPU/NKVD (both refer to different abbreviations for the Soviet political-secret police).[16] In many cases, the Russians or Slavic agents were sent to Manchuria to lure anti-Soviet leaders, partisans and others back to the USSR in "deception operations" such as Trust (Trest), Syndicate I and Syndicate II.[17] These operations were

Manchuria, Korea and Japan) to penetrate the USSR (note all of their defections), see A. M. Nair, *An Indian Freedom Fighter in Japan* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1985), 142-146 and Chang, *Burnt*, 194-195.

10. S. Nikolaev, *Maki Mirazh: iz istorii otechestvennykh spets-sluzhb* [*Maki-Mirage: From the History of the Fatherland's Special Services*] (Khabarovsk: Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 2000), 78–224. Note that Nikolai S. Chumakov is the real name for S. Nikolaev (Chumakov's pen name). However, it was Chumakov's second book, *The Matter of Maki-Mirage* which unwittingly revealed that the Maki-Mirage operation was quite small and perhaps just a front using Japanese communists to play the role of Japanese anti-Soviet intelligence officers. See Nikolai S. Chumakov, *Delo Maki Mirazh* [*The Matter of Maki-Mirage*] (Khabarovsk: Khabarovsk kraevaia tipografiia, 2013), 110-128.

11. See the "mill" operated by Soviet intelligence, Mark Harrison, *One Day We Will Live Without Fear: Everyday Lives under the Soviet Police State* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), 1-42.

12. For general descriptions of the punitive and martial work of Soviet intelligence agents abroad, see George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), *passim*; John J. Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 188, 190, 222; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, *passim*; and Davies, Khlevniuk and Rees, Stalin-Kaganovich, 151, 156fn13.

13. "Russians" refers to any of the Eastern Slavs, Poles, Georgians, Jews, Tatars, and others of a typically European background.

14. This information was obtained from my fieldwork in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. I interviewed six Soviet Chinese and Korean families with relatives who had served in the Soviet GRU (military intelligence) and or OGPU/NKVD (political "secret" police) and a seventh person who wished to remain anonymous. The six are: (1) Gleb Li grandson of Shen Li, May 8, 2009 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, (2) Revmir I. Khan, nephew of Khan Chan Ger (born as Grigorii Eliseevich Khan), June 9, 2009 in Kolkhoz Pravda, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, (3) Raisa V. Nigai, sister of Nikolai V. Nigai, Sept. 24, 2009 in Kolkhoz Sverdlov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan (4) Anna V. Ti daughter of Khai Ir Ti, August 19, 2014 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, (5) Emil S. Liu great-grandson of Ven Sian Liu, May-June 2007 interview by Chang in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and April 15, 2017, video-interview by Emil Liu with Diliara Khabirovna Abuziarova (daughter-in-law of Ven Sian Liu) in Bukhara, Uzbekistan and (6) Elizaveta Li, niece of Nikolai Kuzmich Khan, December 18, 2016 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Most of the people named above were interviewed at minimum from three to four times.

15. This euphemism "special tasks" refers to the hard, punitive or murderous actions carried out by OGPU/NKVD agents, see Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, *passim*.

16. See the case of Abram; Mara Moustafine, *Secrets and Spies: The Harbin Files* (Sydney: Vintage Books, 2002), 242, 244-245, 273-275. Page 274 mentions Abram's work for the INO, NKVD. Leonid Eitingon was born in Belarusia, joined the Cheka at 20 and was assigned to the "international department (INO)" sometime in 1923. His first "international" assignment was China. See Mary-Kay Wilmers, *The Eitingons: A Twentieth-Century Story* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 116-128.

17. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *Iron Maze: The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 257-305; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 43-46; and Wilmers,

meant to convince the anti-Soviet leaders that a healthy and formidable fifth column existed on Soviet soil. In other instances, the "Russian" agents could not carry out the "special tasks" of assassination or planting explosives because they had fathers, mothers, grandparents, sisters, cousins, and other extended family living and working in Manchuria. Some families even had businesses on main street Harbin, Dalny, or other cities in Manchuria! If the agents had attacked any of the high-value targets, their families and extended families would have faced immediate kidnapping and retribution. This is my narrative which corrects some of the disinformation which came from the Russian and Soviet archives.

Figure 6: Top (L-R) Sin Sinsan, a former CLS student (mid-to-late 1920s), Usenko trained the student recruits to shoot and also do so on the run at the CLS. Bottom L-R) Zybalov, Makstis. Both were physical education teachers at the CLS. Photos courtesy of Dmitrii A. Ancha.

The Spy School Named the Chinese-Lenin School of Vladivostok

First, a brief summary of why the Soviet Union sent agents into Manchuria. The Soviets were afraid of a Japanese invasion and the expansion of the Japanese empire on Soviet territories which had begun in the mid-1920s. By 1932 (after Japan's invasion of Manchuria) the Japanese empire occupied two flanks (two colonies: Manchukuo and Korea) which encircled the Maritime region (also known as the Primore, it is the Soviet region from Vladivostok to just below Khabarovsk). Additionally, the Soviets needed to know what was going on in Manchuria, China proper, and Korea. Hence, they opened a spy school to train East Asians from autumn 1924 to spring 1938. The primary training ground (university) was the Chinese-Lenin School (henceforth, CLS) in Vladivostok, Russia. The CLS had actual students as well as former military cadets and soldiers. Both students and former Red Army soldiers (former Red Army officers as well) were trained for espionage operations. The students-turned-agents were typically young communist students from China. The Red Army veterans-turned-agents were typically Soviet Koreans and Soviet Chinese who had been born or raised in the USSR.

Only the "Russians" Get to Play the Soviet Hero

While everyone at the CLS knew about the missions, the USSR kept a lid on the information until it suddenly imploded at the end of 1991. Then, between 2000 and 2014, the Russia Federation began to release documentary films, academic books, and newspaper articles on Operation Maki-Mirage.[18] Unfortunately, there was no mention of the Chinese-Lenin School nor anything about the contributions of East Asian agents to the USSR.[19] The state narrative only told of their intelligence agents (and heroes) being Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Georgians and Tatars. Some six hundred plus East Asian agents from 1920 to 1945 were completely written out of this history. However, serendipity was to play a major role in uncovering the truth. During the Great Terror (referring to the years 1936-38) when the Soviet Union began a huge domestic purge of suspected spies and allegedly traitorous peoples, most of the photos from the various operations in the Russian Far East and Maki-Mirage were burned. But one important and problematic photo remained in the state archives (Figure 7). The photo opens up the question of "Why are there three Chinese men in an NKVD group photo when there is no mention of their service?"

Soviet Intelligence: The Other Diaspora Peoples

According to R. W. Stephan, the USSR was the epitome of the "counterintelligence state."[20] This study supports Stephan's statement and hopefully has demonstrated that the Soviets' agentura possessed

Eitingons, 145.

18. Maki-Mirage was their name for the various aforementioned operations sending espionage agents into Manchukuo, Korea, and China proper.

19. See the two academic books penned by Nikolai S. Chumakov– *Maki-Mirage: From the History of the Fatherland's Special Services* and *The Matter of Maki-Mirage* as well as the Russian made documentary film *Operation: Ghost Agent* (*Операция «Агент призрак»*). *Operation Ghost Agent* made a further mistake by showing a list of participants in Operation Maki-Mirage at around minute 35:50. The list contains all of the Russians (listed individually) but for the East Asians, there were only two names on this list. One was Van In-Zun (the surname Wang is transliterated to Van in Russian) who was the *nachalnik* (head) of the Chinese NKVD regiments. The second was Khan Chan Ger who led the Korean NKVD regiments.

20. Robert W. Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War: Soviet Secret Intelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press),

Figure 7: Operation Maki Mirage on this particular mission employed these eight NKVD agents. Note Sin Sinsan top row, far right and two other Chinese agents. Photo taken in the 1930s in Blagoveshchensk, Russia. Photo courtesy of *Komsomolskaia pravda*.

an unmatched level of theory, practical training, and in some cases, linguistic and cultural fluency (for countries outside the USSR) to approximately 1970.[21] With that in mind, it is highly probable that Soviet intelligence recruited intelligence agents from all of its major diaspora, sending them abroad disguised as Poles, Greeks, Germans, Finns, Romanians, Jews, and others from their respective titular homelands. This evidence emanates from Pavel Sudoplatov's epigraph at the beginning of this article.

This research has examined the "two sections" working on the "Far Eastern" intelligence issues. The intelligence budget for the Soviet western borderlands (Europe and North America), Central Asia, and the Middle East (and the remaining fourteen sections) would have likely been six-to-seven times larger than that for the Russian Far East.[22] Soviet intelligence would have also utilized its national minorities (Soviet Poles, Germans, Finns, Greeks, Turks, Azeris who spoke the closest dialect to Anatolian Turkish, and others) because of its underlying theoretical bases on how to run operations utilizing "deception" and "cover." Agents who were completely bilingual and bicultural (and polyglots) would have possessed natural "cover" and "deception" in order to play their roles as businessmen, engineers, or workers from Poland, Germany, Finland, Greece, Turkey and other nations.[23]

Furthermore, Poland and Germany were seen as far greater enemies (and civilizational threats to the Eastern Slavs) than Japan because of their long history of conflicts and antagonism.[24] Poland also ran its anti-communist "Promethean movement" in the 1920s and 1930s to overthrow Soviet rule in various union republics, borderlands, and areas where national minorities were a majority even using Kuban and Don Cossacks.[25] The Red Orchestra and operations similar to it are prime examples where the Soviets might have employed their Polish and German agents.[26] Trepper, the leader of one network of the Red Orchestra named four universities which trained agent-officers for the GRU and NKVD operations beyond the Soviet borders. He described the Marchlevski University as possessing some twenty sections (by nationality) of either (and or both) Soviet diaspora nationalities and foreign-communist émigrés.[27] There is ample evidence of Germans in Soviet intelligence both domestically and abroad. On August 28, 1941 a set of supplemental instructions (article 11 of the supplemental instructions) was added to the deportation order ordering the exile of all Volga Germans (issued August 26, 1941). These instructions stated, "In relationship to *the employees of the NKVD, Germans by nationality* [italics by author], the question should be decided on a person-to-person basis in the NKVD of the USSR to be interpreted by the UNKVD [the administration of the NKVD]."[28] Returning to the use of Soviet Germans and Poles in intelligence operations, Richard Sorge who was probably the most renowned of all Soviet spies was a German. Rudolf Abel (real name Viliam Genrikhovich Fisher) was a Baltic German who ran a U.S.-based Soviet espionage agent network from 1948 to 1957.[29] His assistant from

40.

21. Chang, *Burnt*, 194-195. "To 1970" due to Russification policies in the USSR that began in the 1930s.

22. The Far Eastern intelligence services were run by the NKVD out of the RFE (Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok), but also out of Chita, Russia by the Russian General Staff; see Anna Vasilevna Ti interview, interview by Jon Chang, November 21, 2016, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

23. Donald Rayfield, *Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him* (New York: Random House, 2004), 305-306. Regarding the themes of deception and cover in intelligence, see Robert M. Clark and William L. Mitchell, *Deception: Counterdeception and Counterintelligence* (London: CQ Press, 2019).

24. Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993),133-138, 158-161; and Rayfield, *Stalin*, 437

25. Kuromiya and Peplonski, "Great", 653-654, 658.

26. Regarding other Soviet diaspora peoples in intelligence, the KGB/FSB archives would have had to have been opened or a researcher would have had to have conducted oral history among survivors (or the relatives of former agents) in order to have confirmed this. For the Red Orchestra, see Leopold Trepper, *The Great Game: The Story of the Red Orchestra* (London: Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1977).

27. Trepper, *Great Game*, 38. Trepper noted various sections of Poles, Germans and Bulgarians at Marchlevski University in Moscow. See also Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 107. For more on the Marchlevski (primarily known as the Marchlewski Communist University of the National Minorities of the West), see (the url, accessed June 22, 2019): *https://strelkamag.com/en/article/12-buildings-of-moscow-construktivism*.

28. GARF- f. 9479, o.124, d. 85, l. 9.

29. Fisher on his deathbed said to his wife the following: "Don't forget that we're Germans.... Remember, this is our ethnicity [natsional'nost].... Remember we're strangers here." This reflects the Soviet nationalities policies which institutionalized the Eastern Slavs (Russians, Ukrainian, Byelorussians) as the "natives" while the others,

1954 to 1957 was Reino Hayhanen, a Soviet Ingrian Finn.[30] In 1959, the approximate Soviet populations for several of the Soviet diaspora peoples were: Poles (1,380,000 persons), Germans (1,620,000 persons), Finns (92,700 persons), Greeks (309,000 persons), and Koreans (314,000 persons).[31] Regarding Turkey, the Soviet Union also had a plethora of choices to recruit from: Tatars (Kazan and Crimean), Meshkhetian Turks, Azeris, and Pontic Greeks. The number of diaspora peoples in the USSR was large, especially for Germans, Poles, Greeks, and Turks. The key factor was that they possessed language proficiencies, cultural fluency, and other skills which could not be taught.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union fielded one of the strongest intelligence services in the world through the early 1970s because of the contributions by their Soviet Greeks, Finns, Germans, Poles, Turks, Iranians/Tadzhiks, Chinese, Koreans, and others. These agents from the various Soviet diaspora communities had natural linguistic abilities (to speak several dialects of the same language, recognize different registers, etc.) and cultural competencies that were subtle, organic, and difficult to quantify. The Stalinist Russification of the USSR and its minority peoples which began during the Great Terror (1936) destroyed the human diversity, wealth, and power inherent within Soviet borders. Second, Maki-Mirage is an example of a large-scale, long-term set of operations which was not as simple as those such as Trust and Syndicate. The operations that have been depicted in this study utilized ample amounts of deception, distraction (upon entering foreign soil), and cover. Returning to the "Russification" of Soviet history, my research and their methods were carried out in order to counter the Soviet archives, Russia's "official history," and even the lack of real interest in Russian minorities (especially in the Russian Far East) by academics and scholars in the West. Oral history and fieldwork allowed me to re-introduce and revivify actors and histories which had been sloughed off, forgotten, erased or reclassified.[32]

Finally, the case of the East Asian agents in Soviet intelligence amply illustrates the practical and theoretical "continuities" in intelligence practices from the Soviet period (OGPU, NKVD, KGB) to contemporary Russia. The Soviet East Asian agents eliminated "hard targets" in punitive or retributive missions much like those to eliminate the FSB defector Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 and the failed attempt to poison former FSB agent Sergei Skripal in 2018.[33] These missions and attempts at assassination using intelligence agents were meant to send a political message to agents who had already defected as well as current agents working and residing within the former USSR and the Russian Federation. The various Soviet diaspora agents also played a similar role to that of the "illegals" except with more linguistic and cultural aplomb and cover.[34] The Soviets as well as the Russian Federation remain convinced of the importance of: humint (human intelligence collection), the elimination of state traitors (or those deemed to be traitors), the socio-political message/meaning evoked through assassination, and debriefings of agents who have collected humint abroad. Another tactic which has been quite successful is the use of illegals and émigrés, and sexual entrapment.[35] Currently, all modern states and their agentura are using both tactics (combined) to collect humint because of the high level of success, cover, and the psychological satisfaction of penetrating the "inner core" of a particular group, organization, or government.

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were "foreigners" even if they had been in the USSR or the Russian empire for five, eight or even ten generations. See Vin Arthey, *Like Father like Son: A Dynasty of Spies* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2004), 234; for Soviet nationalities [ethnic] policies, see Chang, *Burnt*, 186-195.

30. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 192-224.

31. Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*, trans. Pauline M. Tiffen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 94-95.

32. For an example of the latter (revisionism) and its monothematic focus, see Jon K. Chang, "Ethnic Cleansing and Revisionist Russian and Soviet History," *Academic Questions* 32, no. 2 (June 2019): 263-270.

33. Both occurred overseas (in London, United Kingdom).

34. More of a lateral category in comparison with illegals.

35. For example, see the cases of Glenn Duffie Shriver (recruited by China) and Paul Erickson (influenced by Maria Butina of Russia). The Anna Chapman case is an excellent example of the use of "illegals." She was the daughter of a former high-ranking KGB officer. She married an Englishman and obtained a UK passport with perhaps the long-term goal of being sent to America. Some countries use the student/scholar/professor and monetary incentives instead of the émigré/illegal.